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This paper highlights the role of external indebtedness and the presence of inflationary inertia in
order to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of inflation targeting during disinflation episodes.
As the recent Argentinian experience illustrates, a sluggish inflation rate and a significant current-
account deficit may make the stabilization process difficult. To illustrate the point, we build a model
that shows that, when inflation adjusts fast, the target may be achieved without building too much
external debt. But if inflation adjusts slowly, an excessive build-up of external debt could lead to an
increase in the risk premium, a sudden shortage of foreign exchange, and the eventual collapse of the
inflation-targeting regime.
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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper is motivated by the recent stabilization attempt implemented in Argentina. At the
end of 2015, the authorities switched to a more flexible exchange-rate regime, and later
adopted inflation targeting (henceforth, IT).1 During the first two years the performance
was disappointing: inflation remained high, and a large and growing current-account deficit
emerged. There were increasing concerns regarding the sustainability of IT in the near
future, mainly due to the growth rate of foreign debt. Finally, during 2018, while we
were writing the first drafts of this manuscript, IT was abandoned and Argentina reached
an agreement with the IMF, adopting a more traditional stabilization policy that involved
a monetary and fiscal adjustment (although without fixing the exchange rate).
This unsatisfactory state of affairs contrasts with the shared perceptions among the
profession about the virtues of IT as a policy framework. Indeed, the empirical records
of IT do not look bad. In most cases inflation has remained low, without any significant
cost in terms of growth. Some countries experienced hard times fighting inflationary
shocks, and occasionally central banks have resorted to changing the official target
* The authors would like to extend their sincere thanks to Pablo Carreras Mayer, Diego Friedheim,
two anonymous referees, and the editors for their very helpful comments. All errors are our own.
1. The formal beginning of inflation targeting was in September 2016.
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(for example, Brazil during 2002–2003), but almost no country has ever abandoned IT.2
The implementation of IT in Argentina is an interesting case study: it seems to be the
first episode where a monetary policy based on IT (and without any significant
exchange-rate anchor) is used to reduce inflation from annual inflation levels higher
than 20 percent.3
Argentina is well-known for its historically high rates of inflation. However, during the
1990s inflation reached low single digits, though from 2008 onwards, the country has
faced stable and moderate rates of inflation (around 20–25 percentage points on average).
Also, before (and during) the adoption of IT, the new authorities implemented a series of
adjustments of regulated prices (transport and utilities), and a devaluation of 40 percent
after the elimination of capital controls. When inflation is moderate or high, typically the
rate of inflation exhibits some inertia due to the presence of formal and informal indexa-
tion schemes,4 and consequently these abrupt adjustments of relative prices are associated
with an acceleration of the rate of inflation.
The opening of the capital account was another critical ingredient in the stabilization
attempt. The removal of capital controls allowed a large inflow of capital that financed a
growing and significant current-account deficit of about 4–5 percent of gross domestic pro-
duct (GDP). Because disinflation has been slow, the dynamics of the current account were a
crucial factor defining the sustainability of IT in Argentina.
In a nutshell, the authorities have been struggling with a sluggish rate of inflation
(and inflation expectations), frequent and large cost shocks due to the adjustment of
public sector prices and the volatility of the nominal exchange rate, and an increasing
level of foreign indebtedness. When we started writing this paper, we were motivated
by the following questions: Will IT reduce inflation before investors stop lending and
global liquidity disappears? Or will a debt crisis emerge while inflation remains well out-
side the comfort zone? During 2018, Argentina experienced a sudden stop in capital
flows, IT was abandoned, and a new agreement with the IMF was established.
The goal of this paper is to shed light on the conditions determining whether IT is
more likely to succeed as a disinflationary strategy. This is a relatively unexplored question
(with the exception of Calvo 2017), as most countries adopted IT when inflation was
already low (see Roger 2009). Our main contribution is to analyse the problems associated
with stabilization using IT regimes in the presence of imperfect international capital mar-
kets and inertial inflation. Specifically, we argue that slow adjustment of inflation, com-
bined with a fast build-up of external debt, casts doubt on the sustainability of IT in the
long run.
Towards that end, this paper is organized in the following way. After this introduction,
Section 2 presents a brief review of the literature on chronic inflation, stabilization plans,
and IT. Section 3 characterizes the main stylized facts of disinflation episodes using an IT
regime and we briefly discuss the Argentinian context. Section 4 presents a simple model
to provide insights into the sustainability of disinflation through IT and foreign indebted-
ness when financial capital markets are imperfect and inflation displays inertia. Finally,
we conclude in Section 5.
2. The sole exceptions, before Argentina failed, were Spain and the Slovak Republic, which
adopted the euro in 1999 and 2008 respectively, and according to Cobham’s (2018) de facto classi-
fication, Turkey in 2014.
3. Other experiences, such as Chile and Colombia, informally adopted IT, but their exchange-rate
policies were based on exchange-rate bands systems.
4. For different discussions about inertia, see Pazos (1972), Frenkel (1983; 1986), Arida/Lara-
Resende (1985), and Heymann/Leijonhufvud (1995).
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW
This section comments briefly on the main issues and the related contributions. The role
of IT as a stabilization policy remains relatively unexplored, most likely because there are
few case studies where inflation was stopped by using the nominal interest rate as the main
tool, especially in less developed economies: other than the ‘Volcker shock’ during the late
1970s, it is hard to find a successful disinflation policy based mainly on an aggressive
increase in the interest rate. This section provides some hints to explain why.
The literature distinguishes between varieties of inflationary regimes. So-called ‘mod-
erate’ and ‘high’ inflations are usually more resilient and stable than ‘hyperinflations’;
hence most authors include them under the rubric of ‘chronic inflations.’ However,
some authors distinguish between ‘moderate’ (roughly 15–30 percent annual rates) and
‘high’ inflation (above 30 percent, but not ‘hyperinflation’), as we will discuss below.
The literature has claimed that a moderate or high rate of inflation induces the introduc-
tion of explicit or implicit indexation of contracts to past inflation. This is probably because
the adaptation to inflation through formal or informal indexation moderates the rise of
transaction costs avoiding periodical renegotiations. As long as inflation remains moderate
or high, price settings will remain non-synchronized and the rate of inflation will probably
display a stable and inertial behavior (Dornbusch/Fischer 1993). As long as agents do not
fully believe in the ability of central bankers to meet the targeted inflation, they will fore-
cast the future rate of inflation. These computations might be quite costly for them, and
agents might prefer to follow simple heuristics, that is, project the past inflation rate in the
absence of large shocks. Consequently, IT may fail to anchor expectations. For an exten-
sive review of inflation expectation analysis, see Lima et al. (2014).
Indexation, however, implies a series of undesirable features. The rate of inflation
becomes highly dependent on its recent history. Thus, any disruptive event, such as a
large depreciation or an increase in the price of food or public utilities may permanently
increase the rate of inflation, particularly when contracts have been shortened (see Frenkel
1979; 1983; Dornbusch/Simonsen 1983; 1987; Bruno 1988).5 Bruno (1993) highlights
that in episodes of ‘chronic’ inflation it is hard to establish a nominal anchor because infla-
tion ‘may live a life of its own,’ divorced (at least temporarily) from the evolution of the
nominal exchange rate or the money supply, showing a high level of inertia and persis-
tence of the inflation rate. In hyperinflations, however, prices usually follow the nominal
exchange rate, so there is an open door for a quick stabilization of inflation, most likely by
adopting a hard peg (see Heymann/Leijonhufvud 1995).
The main take-home point from this literature is that stabilizing each type of inflation
may require different approaches. Most of the time, IT was adopted when inflation was
already low or moderate, and in the former case, the policy-makers adopted a cautious
approach by adopting a very gradual reduction of inflation and by combining monetary
policy with frequent interventions in the foreign-exchange (FX) markets, capital controls,
and so on. In fact the literature has distinguished between monetary-based and exchange-
rate-based stabilization plans, depending on the instrument which is used as a nominal
anchor. ‘Interest-based stabilization plans’ are really uncommon and are usually not men-
tioned in studies of stabilization plans.
Kiguel/Liviatan (1992) and Reinhart/Vegh (1994) claim that the most important
lessons are that exchange-rate-based plans usually show boom–bust cycles, while
5. Notice that if the duration of contracts becomes very short, the economy can easily move into
the hyperinflation terrain. The shorter the duration of contracts, the larger the impact of any shock
on the level of inflation (see Taylor 1991: ch. 4).
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money-based plans work the other way around. Calvo/Vegh (1994) find that lack of
credibility is more disruptive under fixed exchange rates than under floating exchange
rates. Calvo/Vegh (1999) favor more flexible exchange-rate regimes because balance-of-
payments crises are less likely.6
The degree of inertia is closely related to the cost of disinflation. When inflation is clo-
sely related to its past level, a large recession may be required to reduce inflation. When
this connection is weak, it may be easier to stabilize inflation. Empirical works, for exam-
ple Ball (1994), have estimated sacrifice ratios in disinflation episodes in moderate-infla-
tion OECD countries. The author finds that this ratio decreases with the velocity of the
disinflation (‘cold turkey’ would be better than ‘gradualism’) and the degree of labor mar-
ket flexibility, while the openness of the economy has no effect on the ratio. Income poli-
cies and initial level of inflation are unclear. Hofstetter (2008) finds similar results from
moderate and low disinflation in a sample of 18 Latin American countries between 1973
and 2000 (38 episodes).
However, most of these research studies about inflation are from before 1990, prior
to the beginning of the IT regimes. During recent years IT has become a common
approach to the conducting of monetary policy. The main features of IT are: (a) an
announcement of a numerical inflation target; (b) a major role in an inflation forecast;
and (c) a high degree of transparency and accountability (Svensson 2010). Due to the
so-called ‘trilemma,’ in order to increase the degrees of freedom of monetary policy, the
exchange rate should be allowed to float as freely as possible. Usually, a short-term inter-
est rate becomes the main policy tool (see also Bernanke/Mishkin 1997).
Although there is a growing literature on the effects of IT onmacroeconomic performance,
there is little discussion about the role of IT as a policy to combat chronic inflation, apart from
a few interesting exceptions. Following Calvo (2007; 2017), the recent Argentinian experi-
ence may be described as an interest-rate-based stabilization plan. The inflation target
announced by the central bank plays the role of the nominal anchor. Calvo has shown
that, if the target is not credible, IT may fail to produce long-lasting and effective
stabilization.
Our paper is also related to the post-Keynesian perspective. Traditionally, post-Keynesians
have always been skeptical of any policymix that attempts to fine-tune the economy by setting
a short-term interest rate, including IT. While some authors believe that the best approach is
to park the interest rate at a low level, others think that some counter-cyclical adjustment is
desirable, provided that other policies are also implemented (see Rochon 2007 for a summary
of these two views). In an open-economy set-up, Libman (2018a) emphasizes that, when
devaluations are contractionary, a standard Taylor rule does not work, and parking the
short-term interest rate may be preferable.
Recent post-Keynesian studies on IT in an open economy have suggested that it is impor-
tant to keep track of the path of foreign indebtedness (Porcile et al. 2011) and to add an
endogenous risk premium (Rocha/Oreiro 2013). Such models are consistent with the evi-
dence that shows that after some threshold level, debt can hurt growth. Pattillo et al. (2002)
and Clements et al. (2003) have found that the average effect of debt on growth becomes
6. Calvo/Vegh (1994) also enumerate the stylized facts. Both money-based and exchange-rate-
based plans share real appreciation and deterioration of the current account. Additionally, both
show a slow convergence of inflation to the rate of devaluation/monetary growth, while interest-
rate-based plans show a slow disinflation rate. However, the big difference is with respect to economy
activity. A monetary-based stabilization plan usually shows an initial contraction in economy activity
while an exchange-rate-based stabilization plan shows an initial increase in real activity followed by a
later contraction.
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negative at 35–40 percent of GDP. Rocha/Oreiro (2013) developed a toy model and they
also found non-linear effects on external debt on growth.7
When frictions and imperfections are absent and financial markets are complete, a small
open economy can finance any current-account deficit as needed. However, real-world finan-
cial markets are far from perfect and both the level of the current-account deficit and external
debt matter. Céspedes et al. (2003) offer a plausible formalization using a standard IS–LM–
BP model. They endogenize the premium risk showing that a depreciation of the domestic
currency could be expansionary or contractionary, depending on the level of indebtedness.
Other approaches have been followed in the post-Keynesian tradition in order to analyse
IT and its interactions in a general framework. Cordero (2008) compares the different effects
of adopting a monetary regime based on inflation targeting with respect to a system based on
real exchange-rate targeting in the short and long run. Furthermore, Drumond/Porcile
(2012) study the short- and long-run implications of adopting IT regimes in small open
economies. Their approach is quite similar as ours, despite the fact that our focus is in infla-
tion stabilization and endogenous crisis as a consequence of imperfect capital markets.8
Our paper is also related to Vera (2014). He builds a model where the policy authorities
are committed to hitting inflation and/or output targets, and also to the achievement of
the external equilibrium. His paper concludes that in order to maintain the inflation to
target, the monetary authority should rely on higher interest rates and the strong effect
of the unemployment channel. Finally, Summa (2016) incorporates an IT regime in a
Sraffian supermultiplier model where inflation is assumed to be a cost-push phenomenon
and the monetary authority can manage the nominal exchange rate through targeting
interest-rate differentials. The author concludes that IT regime adoption is not neutral
in terms of long-run growth and functional income distribution.
In short, a quick look at the literature suggests that IT in Argentina faced several challenges.
The rate of inflation displays inertial behavior and (as we will discuss shortly) some relative
prices are under a process of adjustments, so disinflation will be slow and possibly subject
to ups and downs. In the presence of imperfect international capital markets, a growing cur-
rent-account deficit was proven difficult to sustain. This may cast some doubts on the sustain-
ability of the inflation targets, and possibly of the entire IT regime. To sum up, we will assess
how these trade-offs interact under the adoption of an IT regime, when the starting point is a
moderate inflation rate with high persistence and capital-market imperfections.
3 STYLIZED FACTS
This section reviews some of the stylized facts about disinflation, IT, and the recent Argentine
experience. We discuss the dynamics of inflation, growth, and the current account during the
disinflation phase. We show that the level of inflation at which IT is typically adopted is
usually much lower than the levels at which Argentina adopted IT. Alternatively, some coun-
tries started at similar levels of inflation, but none of them adopted a strict version of IT.
Our first step is to highlight the initial conditions when IT is adopted. Because some
countries may adopt IT informally, we draw on Cobham’s (2018) de facto classification of
7. Our model builds on this evidence of capital market imperfections. In a world of perfect capital
mobility and perfect assets, substitutability would not be relevant to take account of country differences
of premium risk. See Edwards (1986) for a longer review on the topic.
8. They analyse four monetary regimes: a mixed regime (a combination of inflation target and a
target for capacity utilization), a regime that gives priority to external stability, a conservative regime,
and a Keynesian regime.
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monetary policy regimes (based on IMF Article IV consultations). In Table 1a, we show a
complete list of countries which adopted some variety of IT as a monetary framework and
the initial inflation at the moment of their adoption. Table 1b shows Cobham’s classifica-
tion. In total we found 34 countries, which, at a given moment in their history, adopted
one form of IT or another.





Australia 1993–1996 Loose inflation targeting 1% 2% 3% 3%
Australia 1997–2014 Full inflation targeting 3% 0% 3% 3%
Brazil 1999–2000 Loose converging inflation targeting 3% 5% 6% 7%
Brazil 2004–2014 Loose inflation targeting 15% 7% 6% 6%
Canada 1992–2014 Full inflation targeting 6% 2% 2% 2%
Chile* 1991–1999 Loose converging inflation targeting 26% 22% 10% 3%
Chile* 2000–2014 Full inflation targeting 3% 4% 3% 5%
Colombia** 1992–1998 Loose/converging inflation targeting 31% 27% 22% 19%
Colombia** 1999–2014 Full inflation targeting 19% 11% 6% 3%
Czech Rep. 1998–2005 Loose converging inflation targeting 8% 11% 4% 2%
Czech Rep. 2006–2014 Full inflation targeting 2% 3% 2% 0%
Euro area*** 1999–2014 Loose inflation targeting 1% 1% 2% 0%
Finland 1993–1996 Full inflation targeting 3% 2% 1% 1%
Finland 1997–1998 Inflation with exchange rate targeting 1% 1% 1% 1%
Hungary 2001–2006 Loose converging inflation targeting 10% 9% 6% 4%
Hungary 2007–2014 Loose inflation targeting 4% 8% 4% 0%
Iceland 2001–2005 Loose inflation targeting 5% 6% 4% 4%
Iceland 2013–2014 Loose inflation targeting 5% 4% 3% 2%
Indonesia 2006–2014 Loose converging inflation targeting 10% 13% 7% 6%
Israel 1992–1994 Exchange rate with inflation targeting 19% 12% 12% 12%
Israel 1995–1996 Inflation with exchange rate targeting 12% 10% 11% 11%
Israel 1997–2003 Loose converging inflation targeting 11% 9% 4% 1%
Israel 2004–2014 Full inflation targeting 1% −2% 2% 1%
Italy 1995–1996 Monetary plus inflation targeting 4% 5% 5% 4%
Italy 1997–1998 Exchange rate, monetary, inflation
targeting
4% 2% 2% 2%
Japan 2006–2012 Loose inflation targeting −1% 0% 0% 0%
Japan 2013–2014 Full inflation targeting 0% 0% 2% 3%
Mexico 2001–2003 Loose converging inflation targeting 10% 6% 5% 5%
Mexico 2004–2010 Loose inflation targeting 5% 5% 4% 4%
Mexico 2011–2014 Full inflation targeting 4% 3% 4% 4%
New Zealand 1990–2014 Full inflation targeting 6% 6% 2% 1%
Norway 2001–2014 Full inflation targeting 3% 3% 2% 2%
Peru 2002–2014 Full inflation targeting 2% 0% 3% 3%
Philippines 2002–2008 Loose inflation targeting 5% 3% 5% 8%
Philippines 2009–2014 Full inflation targeting 8% 4% 4% 4%
Poland 1998–2003 Loose converging inflation targeting 15% 12% 6% 3%
Poland 2004–2014 Full inflation targeting 3% 4% 3% 0%
Romania 2014 Loose inflation targeting 4% 1% 1% 1%
Romania 2006–2013 Loose converging inflation targeting 9% 7% 6% 4%
(continues opposite)
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Singapore 1986–2014 Loose inflation targeting 1% −1% 2% 1%
S. Korea 1998–2014 Full inflation targeting 4% 8% 3% 1%
Slovakia 2005–2008 Inflation plus exchange rate targeting 8% 3% 4% 5%
Slovenia 2002–2003 Inflation with exchange rate targeting 8% 8% 7% 6%
Slovenia 2004–2006 Exchange rate with inflation targeting 6% 4% 3% 3%
South Africa 2003–2014 Loose inflation targeting 9% 6% 6% 6%
Spain 1995–1998 Inflation plus exchange rate targeting 5% 5% 3% 2%
Sweden 1993–2014 Full inflation targeting 2% 5% 1% 0%
Switzerland 2000–2010 Loose inflation targeting 1% 2% 1% 1%
Switzerland 2011–2014 Inflation with exchange rate targeting 1% 0% 0% 0%
Thailand 2000–2009 Loose inflation targeting 0% 2% 3% −1%
Thailand 2010–2014 Full inflation targeting −1% 3% 3% 2%
Turkey 2003–2013 Loose inflation targeting 47% 26% 10% 8%
UK 1993–1996 Loose inflation targeting 4% 3% 2% 3%
UK 1997–2014 Full inflation targeting 3% 2% 2% 2%
USA 1996–2011 Loose inflation targeting 3% 3% 3% 3%
USA 2012–2014 Full inflation targeting 3% 2% 2% 2%
Note: Highlighted are the countries with moderate inflation when they adopted some kind of IT
regime. The darkness of the tints reflects higher initial level of inflation rate. The distinction is
between inflation rate levels higher than 15 percent, and inflation rates between 15 and 10 percent.
Sources:
* Consumer price index from Chile was taken from Central Bank web page.
** Colombia does not appear in Cobham (2018)'s classification, however from Chang (2008) we can
distinguish two periods.
***Harmonized index.




LIT Loose inflation targeting ITs Narrow stationary targets not well hit
or wider targets attained
FIT Full inflation targeting ITs Narrow announced stationary targets
typically attained
LCIT Loose converging inflation
targeting
ITs Converging narrow targets not well
hit or wider targets attained
ERwIT Exchange rate with
inflation targeting
MixedTs Inflation targets and exchange-rate (fixes
or) targets, exchange rate dominant
IwERT Inflation with
exchange rate targeting
MixedTs Inflation targets and exchange-rate
(fixes or) targets, inflation dominant
M&IT Monetary plus
inflation targeting
MixedTs Monetary and inflation targets,
primacy unclear
ER&M&IT Exchange rate, monetary,
inflation targeting
MixedTs Three full targets (or fixes), whichever
dominant
I&ERT Inflation plus exchange
rate targeting
MixedTs Inflation targets and exchange-rate
(fixes or) targets, primacy unclear
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Several lessons emerge fromTable 1a. Despite the fact that most countries adopted IT when
their inflation rate was already low, a few cases are similar to Argentina (that is, they adopted IT
while trying to reduce the inflation rate significantly). An interesting example is Turkey. This is
the only country that adopted IT with an inflation rate above the 30 percent range, averaging
47 percent during the previous year. Turkey converged to an inflation rate of 8 percent in
2013, but following Cobham’s classification, IT was then abandoned.
Colombia, Chile, Brazil, Israel, and Poland are also cases where IT was adopted with an
average inflation rate above 15 percent. Hungary,Mexico, and Indonesia started with an infla-
tion rate above 10 percent but below 15 percent. These cases provide some insights about the
process of disinflation using IT. Tables 2a and 2b show some of the stylized facts, dividing
between episodes where the inflation rate at the beginning was above 15 percent (moderate/
high inflation), and those where it was between 15 percent and 10 percent (moderate/low
inflation). We show the evolution of the real exchange rate, the current account, and econ-
omy activity.
The gray-tinted rows are the relevant episodes of disinflation which are delimited by a
shift of the monetary frameworks. None of these countries has chosen a full inflation tar-
geting (FIT) regime when they had to reduce inflation starting from high or moderate
levels. When the inflation rate was already controlled, they then shifted to a FIT. The
speed of disinflation9 in those cases is around 1 percent per quarter during the first
two years, with the exception of Turkey, which reached 4.5 percent per quarter on
average.
During the implementation year and the following years the growth rates are usually
positive, with very few quarters of negative growth. The only exception is Colombia in
1999, after the shift to FIT, and Israel in 1992. Most of the cases show a real exchange
appreciation after the adoption of IT.10 They also accumulated sizeable current-account
deficits. Towards the end of the disinflation period, the current-account deficits were
very large in some cases – for instance, about 6.7 percent of GDP in Turkey, 5.2 percent
in Colombia, and around 4 percent in Brazil and Israel.
Patterns are less clear when inflation rates start below an annual rate of 15 percent.
Inflation deceleration is slower but so is the urgency of disinflation. The performances
in terms of growth are at least acceptable and the real exchange rates tend to appreciate
in some cases while in others they remain stable at the end of the period. Current accounts
are usually in deficit and/or worsen over time in most of these cases.
To summarize, stabilization of moderate or high inflation usually involves the adoption
of a less strict IT regime. The episodes feature a slow convergence of the rate of inflation
towards low levels. Growth is usually positive and the current account deteriorates.
3.1 Initial conditions in Argentina
We will now briefly consider the case of Argentina. From 2008 to 2015 the average
annual inflation rate was around 27 percent. The real exchange rate appreciated continu-
ously from 2009, and capital controls were imposed in October 2011 to prevent capital
9. We follow Ball (1994), who measures the average speed of disinflation as the total change in
inflation divided by the time length of the disinflation phase.
10. All of the identified cases, including Colombia and the rest of the sample, are consistent with
the contractionary devaluation hypothesis (real exchange appreciation is associated with GDP
growth). See García Lázaro/Perrotini (2014) for a detailed analysis of Mexico, Brazil, and Chile;
Chang (2008) for Colombia, Brazil, and Chile; Calvo/Mendoza (1999) for Chile; and Morra
(2014) for Chile and Colombia.
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flight, creating a parallel market. Regulated prices such as public services and transport
were almost frozen from 2003. The fiscal stance was clearly negative, with a fiscal deficit
of 5.1 percent of GDP in 2015. External debt was also in a pseudo-default because of an
adverse court ruling with bondholders, after a series of restructuring attempts and the
economy was running short of foreign exchange.
The new government elected towards the end of 2015 had very few options other than
stabilization. However, there was some room for choosing the type of stabilization plan.
Shortly after the new government took the office, a new debt-restructuring attempt was
implemented and the capital controls were removed. A more flexible exchange-rate regime
was also adopted. The liberalization of the capital account caused an important devalua-
tion of about 36 percent in December 2015, which accelerated inflation (reaching an
annual rate of 38.6 percent in 2016).
The government also signaled its intention to cut the fiscal deficit, re-establishing a
coherent system of public-service tariffs. Unfortunately, this also accelerated the inflation
rate. As we are writing this paper in 2018, Argentina has experienced an annual rate of
inflation above 15 percent for 11 years in a row. Table 3 provides some statistics.
In September 2016 the central bank formally announced the implementation of IT.
The inflation target was set between 12 percent and 17 percent for 2017, 8 percent
and 12 percent for 2018, and between 3.5 percent and 6 percent for 2019. Since inflation
in 2016 was 39 percent (on average), the rate of disinflation required to meet the higher
bound targeted in 2017 was around 5.4 percent each quarter. This is even higher than
during Turkey’s disinflation, which is the fastest disinflation episode in our sample.
The annual average inflation rate in 2017 was 25.7 percent and the authorities decided
to change the target to 15 percent in 2018.




























2003 14.9% 95.97 – – 6.4% 139.2% 79.2% 959.6% 393.4%
2004 4.4% 100.26 2.2% – 2.0% 118.0% 68.5% 736.2% 362.8%
2005 9.6% 102.20 1.6% 8.9% 2.7% 68.0% 31.8% 236.8% 141.4%
2006 10.9% 104.78 1.5% 8.0% 2.8% 59.1% 24.1% 222.2% 130.5%
2007 17.5% 101.53 0.9% 9.0% 2.1% 51.4% 21.8% 165.4% 115.5%
2008 27.2% 92.21 0.9% 4.1% 1.5% 44.5% 16.7% 165.3% 94.0%
2009 14.9% 91.05 −0.9% −5.9% 2.2% 45.5% 16.7% 165.8% 119.9%
2010 23.6% 82.43 −1.0% 10.1% −0.4% 40.0% 14.6% 185.1% 119.1%
2011 26.8% 77.00 −1.8% 6.0% −1.0% 35.9% 12.0% 231.9% 110.2%
2012 24.6% 65.95 −2.4% −1.0% −0.4% 37.4% 11.2% 268.9% 123.4%
2013 23.8% 63.56 −2.9% 2.4% −2.4% 40.1% 11.8% 410.2% 140.0%
2014 37.0% 67.00 −4.1% −2.5% −1.6% 41.4% 12.6% 457.6% 175.8%
2015 26.6% 52.56 −5.1% 2.7% −2.9% 48.6% 13.9% 582.4% 212.6%
2016 38.6% 59.80 −7.1% −1.8% −2.7% 51.7% 17.8% 464.0% 254.4%
2017 25.7% 56.03 −6.4% 2.9% −4.9% 52.9% 19.4% 420.0% 293.1%
Source: Own elaboration from national sources.
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To summarize, the authorities were committed to attempting an interest-rate-based
stabilization plan using IT. After the large depreciation in December 2015, there were sig-
nificant pressures towards appreciation, which explains why the current-account deficit
was rising (Figure 1 shows the correlation between current-account deficit and exchange
rate, and between exchange rate and inflation in Argentina). The initial low level of exter-
nal debt reduces some of the concerns, but during 2016–2017 foreign-currency-denomi-
nated debt started to increase and the ratio between debt and exports did not look as good
as before.11 Additionally, as Table 4 shows, public expectations and a professional forecast
of inflation kept at least 5 percentage points higher than the inflation target during 2017
and the beginning of 2018, reflecting a combination of inertia and imperfect credibility.
The IT regime collapsed in 2018 after an abrupt reversal of capital flows and a large depre-

















































































































Arg/Latin Arg/Average Argentina (right axis)
Figure 1 (a) Current account and real effective exchange rate (2004–2017); (b) Real
effective exchange rate and inflation rate (December 2015–February 2018); (c) EMBI plus:
Argentina; spread vs Latin countries and spread vs simple average of Brasil, Uruguay, Chile,
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Colombia
11. The situation was aggravated by the fiscal deficit of 6.4 percent of GDP and the repressed
inflation due to the frozen tariff of public services. Sooner rather than later, these dynamics can
be disruptive through an increase of the premium risk (EMBI+) and a sudden-stop episode.
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4 A MODEL
This section lays out a basic model that captures some of the fact of the Argentinian sta-
bilization attempt using an interest-based plan. Our model is simple but it captures some
of the lessons of the paper: when disinflation is slow and external debt accumulates fast (or
the level of indebtedness is already high), IT may fail: disinflation requires a prolonged
period of current-account deficit which may become unsustainable.
Specifically, we show that the real exchange rate that is consistent with an inflation rate
equal to the target is not necessarily consistent with external equilibrium. If the real exchange
rate that is consistent with the disinflation process is too low (that is, a large real appreciation is
required), pressures towards depreciation may emerge and the central bank may lose control
over the rate of inflation. Eventually, they could be forced to abandon IT.12
By contrast, when inflation adjusts fast or external debt is low enough, stabilization using IT
may work, albeit some corrections may be needed after the stabilization periods ends. As the
evidence reviewed shows, a real appreciation may be required. However, once inflation is stabi-
lized, it is possible to adjust relative prices withoutmuch impact on inflation.13 Fast adjustment
of inflation is related three main factors: (a) fast adjustment of expectations to changes in infla-
tion; (b) strong effects of monetary policy on wages and prices through changes in the level of
activity; and (c) strong effects of monetary policy on wages and prices through direct changes
in the real exchange rate. Regarding (b), notice that, broadly speaking, an interest-based rule
will affect demand due to changes in the real interest rates and on the real exchange rate.
One of the key assumptions that wemade is that the economy can operate on a two-regime
framework. In the first regime, the stock of external debt is small and international liquidity is
plentiful. Thus, the domestic economy can finance large current-account deficits. Financial
investors know that a reversal of capital flows is not likely, so the expected ‘equilibrium’
real exchange rate is determined by domestic conditions (that is, the state of the goods market
and wage claims). In the second regime, the stock of external debt is large and the domestic
economy may suffer from balance-of-payments pressures. Financial investors are no longer
12. IT may not be abandoned, but it may be modified on the move. As shown by Davig/Leeper
(2006), the monetary policy rules may change after certain variables, such as the output gap or infla-
tion, surpass some critical threshold. Moreover, Kim/Yim (2016) show that the target is often
increased after inflation exceeds the upper level of the band.
13. Recently, in Latin America, IT cases such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, or Peru have
witnessed large currency depreciations with small (in a historical perspective) impacts on the rate
of inflation. See Gosh (2013) for evidence which documents that the decline in the pass-through
in Latin America is related, among other things, to the decline in the rate of inflation.






















Dec-17 25% 25% 25% −0.2% 20% 4.3% 12% 17%
Dec-18 29% – 20% 7.3% 17.4% 9.7% 8% 12%
Jan-19 28% – 20% 6.7% 18.6% 7.9% 15% 15%
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willing to finance any external deficit unless they are properly compensated by a risk premium,
and they also expect the real exchange rate to revert towards a level that is consistent with
current-account equilibrium. In this scenario a currency crisis may develop.
To model the disinflation process we rely on three main ingredients: (a) an expectations-
augmented Phillips curve that features sticky inflation due to indexation; (b) a Taylor rule;
and (c) stylized external sector dynamics, which combines a highly open capital account and
an endogenous risk premium that is an increasing function of the level of external indebt-
edness. While the elements (a), (b), and (c) are standard, our modeling assumptions depart
from conventional models in several ways. The most noticeable is that the economy does
not necessarily reach full employment and it may be difficult to attain a level of the real
exchange rate that is consistent with full employment, external equilibrium, and price
stability (that is, the central bank may fail to meet the inflation target).
To keep the algebra simpler, all the variables, except for interest rates, are defined in natural
logarithms. The first equation specifies the equilibrium condition for asset markets. We
assume that the private sector can hold domestic assets that pay some interest rate i or foreign
assets that pay i f . In equilibrium, yields should be equalized, including risk premium ∅ and
expected capital gains/losses:
i ¼ i f þ _se þ∅: (1)
The expected rate of depreciation satisfies _se ¼ se − s, so the expected rate of depreciation
is equal to the nominal rate expected to prevail (tomorrow) minus the exchange rate today.
The risk premium will depend on the stock of foreign debt (as a proportion of domestic
output), but we assume that it is zero for a low level of external indebtedness.
The role of equation (1) when the central bank targets inflation using the interest rate
is to pin down the path for the nominal exchange rate, which together with the path of
inflation determines the path for the real exchange rate. To see this, add and subtract
domestic inflation π and foreign inflation π f from both sides:
i− π ¼ i f − π f þ _se þ π f − πþ∅: (1a)
Let the real interest rate be defined as the domestic nominal rate minus the rate of infla-
tion r ¼ i− π, and the international real rate as the domestic nominal rate minus foreign
inflation r f ¼ i f − π f . From its definition, the expected rate of real depreciation satisfies
the following law of motion _Q
e ¼ _se þ π f − π. We then obtain:
_Q
e ¼ r − r f −∅: (1b)
Equation (1b) is a real interest parity that includes a risk premium. To simplify, let us
assume that expectations in financial markets are regressive,14 so investors expect the
real exchange rate to exhibit mean reversion at some constant speed towards some equili-
brium real exchange rate:
_Q
e ¼ θðQ −QÞ with θ> 0: (2)
14. Regressive expectations are consistent with different approaches, for instance rational expectations.
The main goal of this specification is to capture a negative relation between the real rate interest and the
real exchange rate (holding constant the equilibrium real exchange rate, the foreign rate, and the risk
premium). Alternatively, we can follow Porcile et al. (2011) and adopt adaptive expectations with simi-
lar results: high (low) real rates relative to the international real rate are associated with a real apprecia-
tion (depreciation).
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The equilibrium real exchange rate should be consistent with the rest of the model and it
will be defined below. When liquidity is plentiful (that is, the balance-of-payments con-
straint is not binding), it would be governed by the combination of the level of domestic
activity and wage claims. When investors see that the level of external debt surpasses a
critical threshold, they will start to incorporate that into their calculations of the equili-
brium real exchange rate.
Combining (1b) with (2), we obtain:
Q ¼ Q − θ′ðr − r f −∅Þ where θ′ ¼ 1
θ
: (3)
According to (3), the real exchange rate is below its long-run expected equilibrium when-
ever the real yield of domestic assets is higher than the real yield of foreign assets adjusted
for risk. In other words, when r > r f −∅ we have Q < Q . Likewise, it is above equili-
brium whenever the opposite is true, or r < r f −∅.
Notice that equation (3) is consistent with the empirical evidence which suggests that the
real exchange rate eventually reverts back to equilibrium, barring some extreme episodes
such as a hyperinflation (see Taylor 1988). The empirical evidence does not favor the uncov-
ered interest parity (UIP) hypothesis (Zhou 2002), but we basically want to capture a nega-
tive relation between the real interest rate and the real exchange rate (holding everything else
constant).15
The domestic real interest rate is set according to the following Taylor rule:
r ¼ i− π ¼ γ0 þ γ1ðπe − πT Þ; (4)
where the real interest rate is adjusted whenever expected inflation departs from the infla-
tion target.16 We assume that the international real rate is exogenously given for the
domestic economy. Notice that when πe ¼ πT , the real rate is equal to the constant
r ¼ γ0. This real rate of interest is what the central bank considers the ‘equilibrium’
real interest rate. Then the most reasonable and common assumption is to set the domes-
tic natural rate of interest equal to the foreign real rate plus the risk premium, so
γ0 ¼ r f þ∅.
It is standard to assume that equation (4) fully represents how the central bank con-
ducts monetary policy. Implicitly it is assumed that any discrepancy between money sup-
ply and money demand is automatically corrected by the central bank, so there is no need
to keep track of the money stock (see Woodford 2003: chs 2 and 3). It is also important to
point out that equations (3) and (4) define not only the real interest rate and the
real exchange rate, but also the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate.
15. Finally, it is possible to stick to a dynamic equation such as (2), but this increases the dimen-
sion of the dynamic system without drastically modifying the main plot. This same strategy is
adopted, for example, in the classical overshooting paper (Dornbusch 1976).
16. As pointed out by an anonymous referee, it could be hard for the central bank to estimate πe
when expectations are heterogeneous. As shown by Lima et al. (2014), inflation can also converge
to the target even under that scenario. We simplify the model by assuming that expectations are
homogeneous and that the central bank can easily forecast the rate of expected inflation. Alterna-
tively, we can derive a similar model with inflation (and foreign debt) as the state variable(s),
assuming that the central bank reacts to the gap between the actual inflation and the target
π− πT , and setting πe ¼ π−1, which is another way to introduce inertia into the dynamics (see,
for example, Dornbusch/Simonsen 1987).
16 European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention, Advance Access
© 2019 The Author Journal compilation © 2019 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/05/2019 08:26:53AM by hquinn@e-elgar.co.uk
via Edward Elgar Publishing
The Taylor rule assumes that, for a given rate of inflation, the central bank sets the nom-
inal interest rate to achieve a certain real interest rate. In turn, this defines a nominal
exchange rate that is consistent with arbitrage in assets markets.
Equation (4) may also include output as an argument, but this only complicates the
algebra without adding any new insights. We are assuming that the central bank’s over-
riding objective is to reduce inflation.17 Combining (3) and (4) we obtain:
Q ¼ Q − θ′γ1ðπe − πT Þ: (5)
Thus the real exchange rate is consistent with investors’ long-run expected equilibrium
whenever inflation is equal to the target.
Domestic prices are set according to a mark-up rule, assuming constant labor produc-
tivity, which is normalized and set equal to one (so its log is equal to zero):
P ¼ mþ w; (6)
where P is the domestic price level, W is the nominal wage, and m is the mark-up.18 We
assume that wage setting is based on imperfect information because workers do not know
the price level so they bargain based on their expectations. In other words, the nominal
wage satisfies:
w ¼ CPI þ ω ¼ ψP þ ð1−ψÞsP þ ω; (7)
where CPI is the consumer price index level, which is a weighted average of domestic and
foreign prices, and ω is the real wage (in terms of domestic goods), where ψ and ð1−ψÞ
are the shares of domestic and foreign goods in CPI. We should notice that in our set-up,
the rate of inflation that is relevant for the central bank is the rate of growth of P, and not
the rate of growth of CPI . Thus, in equation (4) we are assuming that monetary policy
targets what we may call ‘core inflation.’19
From (6) and (7) it follows that the (log of the) real wage satisfies:
ω ¼ −m− ð1−ψÞðsP − PÞ ¼ ðψ− 1ÞQ −m: (8)
17. More precisely, let us assume that output is a negative function of the real interest rate only,
and the real interest rate is a positive function of inflation and output. Then the reduced form solu-
tion implies that output is a negative function of inflation, regardless of the weight of output on the
central-bank reaction function, provided that the real rate is a positive function of inflation and
output. In any case, excluding the output gap does not seem to be a bad assumption for Latin
American countries. For example, Moura/Carvalho (2010) show that the output gap matters only
for Chile (see Libman 2018b for additional estimations).
18. Open-economy post-Keynesian models follow a ‘consumer approach’ (Blecker 2011) or a ‘pro-
ducer approach’ (Bhaduri/Marglin 1990: sec. 3). In the latter, the exchange rate affects prices
because workers consume imported goods, while in the former, the same effect is present because
firms produce using labor and imported intermediated inputs. For our purposes, both approaches
yield similar insights, so we stick to the simpler specification, which is the ‘consumer approach.’.
19. Consider what happens if the price of imported goods increases. In our set-up, this creates
inflationary pressures through wages because workers consume imported goods. The central bank
will increase the nominal and the real interest rate to offset that shock. If we assume that the central
bank targets total inflation, we are only adding an additional reason to tighten monetary policy. The
usual stability conditions associated with the so-called ‘Taylor principle’ are slightly modified, but
nothing substantial changes (see, for example Calvo 2017).
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Thus the real wage is a negative function of the mark-up and the real exchange rate
(because ψ< 1). Differentiating (6) with respect to time and assuming a constant
mark-up, we obtain:
π ¼ _w (9)
We model the law of motion of the wages as a function of expected inflation and the gap
between the target real wageω and the actual real wage. We adopt the following specification:
_w ¼ πe þΩðω −ωÞ with Ω > 0: (10)
We assume that the target real wage is an increasing function of output ωðY Þ ¼ ω1Y .
Because prices are formed assuming a constant mark-up over labor cost, and labor produc-
tivity is assumed to be constant and equal to one, output and employment are equal.
A high level of output means that employment is also high, so workers’ real wage target
tends to increase. Likewise, when output is low, employment is low, so the real wage tar-
get tends to fall.
Combining (9) and (10) we obtain an expectations-augmented Phillips curve for an
open economy:
π ¼ πe þΩðω0 þ ω1Y þ ω2QÞ with ω0;ω1;ω2 > 0; (11)
where ω0 ¼ m and ω2 ¼ ð1−ψÞ. We can verify that the level of the real exchange rate
plays a key role in affecting inflation, and that real appreciation may play a critical role
during the disinflation process (as highlighted by García Lázaro/Perrotini 2014). A higher
real exchange rate (for a given level of output) lowers the purchasing power of wages in
terms of foreign goods triggering social unrest, strikes, and so on. In contrast, a lower
real exchange rate lowers the relative price of imported goods, increasing the purchasing
power of wages and decreasing the gap with the target real wage (see Gerchunoff/Rapetti
2016; Razmi 2018).
Output is demand-determined and defined by the following equation:
Y ¼ β0 − β1r þ β2Q with β0; β1; β2 > 0: (12)
Equation (12) says that the real interest rate has a negative effect on demand, production,
and employment, while the real exchange rate has a positive effect. Contractionary effects
from depreciations can be easily accommodated by assuming that β2 < 0.20 Other factors,
such as foreign demand, animal spirits, or fiscal policy, are included in the parameter β0.
A quick inspection of the system that we have so far shows that (11) and (12) can be
solved for output and inflation, taking expected inflation as given. To see this, use (4)
and (5) to substitute and to obtain:
π ¼ πe þ Ωðω0 þ ω1Y Þ þΩω2½ Q − θ′γ1ðπe − πT Þ (13)
Y ¼ β0 − β1½γ0 þ γ1ðπe − πT Þ þ β2½ Q − θ′γ1ðπe − πT Þ: (14)
20. Alternatively, they can be included by making the risk premium a positive function of the real
exchange rate, provided that this effect is stronger than the traditional expansionary effects captured
by β2 (see Céspedes et al. 2003).
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Equations (13) and (14) define an aggregate-demand–aggregate-supply framework, given
the parameters and the exogenous variables ( Q , πe , and πT ). Imposing the consistency of
expectations we obtain πe ¼ π ¼ πT and thus the system boils down to:
0 ¼ Ωðω0 þ ω1Y Þ þ Ωω2 Q (15)
Y ¼ β0 − β1γ0 þ β2 Q : (16)
Substituting (15) into (16) and solving for Q :
Q ¼ − ε½ω0 þ ω1ðβ0 − β1γ0Þ; (17)
where ε ¼ 1ω2þω1β2. Thus, the equilibrium real exchange rate is a function of the parameters
of the model. Exogenous wage pressures ω0, fiscal policy, and the foreign real rate γ0, all
affect the equilibrium real exchange rate.
It is important to notice that this equilibrium real exchange is not necessarily consistent
with balance-of-payments equilibrium. Moreover, the resulting level of output does not
need to imply full employment. Inflation can be stabilized (see equation (20) below), pro-
vided that whatever combination of output and the real exchange rate do not imply an
unsustainable current account for too long. If the resulting current account does not
lead to an excessive accumulation of foreign debt, it could make sense for private investors
to expect (17) to prevail. Additionally, because capital inflows are short term in nature, it
may make sense to a have a short-term planning horizon as well.
But if inflation falls very slowly and the level of the external debt reaches a critical threshold –
through the exchange-rate appreciation mechanism – they may realize that the economy is
placed on an unsustainable path. In this case, they might require a premium risk and
might build expectations about long-run real exchange that should be consistent with a con-
stant level of foreign debt in the long run. We will discuss how this real exchange rate is
defined, but for now we assume that debt is low enough (or that there is a current-account
surplus even when Q as defined by (17) prevails).
Inflation expectations are not exogenous, and need not be aligned with the target, at
least in the short run. We assume that expectations are formed using an adaptive
scheme:
_πe ¼ σðπ− πeÞ with σ> 0: (18)
Thus the rate of change of expected inflation is an increasing function of the ‘expectation gap’
(the distance between inflation and expected inflation). There are different ways to rationa-
lize equation (18). We can assume that it works as a simple form of adaptive expectations,
but it is also possible that formal and informal indexation schemes may prevent the expected
rate of inflation to adjust instantaneously, for instance after the central bank announces a
new inflation target. The presence of some inertia in the rate of expected inflation, and con-
sequently on the rate of inflation, is key to illustrating the dynamics of disinflation with IT,
and more precisely the Argentinian case.
Inserting (13) into (14) and the resulting equation into (18) yields the dynamic
equation that governs expectations as a function of the parameters and expected
inflation:
_πe ¼ σ½ϑ1 −ϑ2ðπe − πT Þ (19)
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with:
ϑ1 ¼ Ω½ω0 þ ω1β0 þ ðω2 þ ω1β2Þ Q − β1γ0ω1≥ 021
ϑ2 ¼ Ωγ1½ðω2 þ ω1β2Þθ′þ β1ω1> 0:
It is straightforward to show that, unless depreciations are strongly contractionary (and
hence β2 < 0 which may imply ϑ2 < 0Þ, the system is always stable. Contractionary depre-
ciations imply that a higher real rate promotes a real appreciation that expands demand,
but inflation can be stabilized if the effect of the changes in exchange rate on wages and
prices are more important than the effects of changes in output.
The speedof adjustment towards equilibrium is governedby the combinedparameterϑ2 and
the speed of adjustment of expectations σ (that is, they define the size of ∂ _π
e
∂πe). Large elasticity
of demand to interest rate, large sensitivity of monetary policy with respect to inflation, and
large effects of output and real exchange rate on wage claim will increase the size of ϑ2.
Consider now what happens if the inflation target πT is reduced. Notice that neither
output, the real exchange rate, nor the real interest rate are affected in equilibrium, but
because πe > πT , both the real interest rate increases and the real exchange rate appreciates
on impact. More precisely, if we denote the solution to (19) by:
πeðtÞ ¼ ðπT − πe0ÞðexpÞ−σϑ2t þ πT : (20)
Then notice that by equation (20),22 the deviation from equilibrium πeðtÞ− πT is larger
the larger the initial gap between target and expectations πT − πe0, and the smaller the
speed of adjustment σϑ2. Consider the equation of equilibrium real exchange rates (5),
repeated below:
Q ¼ Q − θ′½γ1ðπe − πT Þ: (5)
Substituting (20) into (5), it is possible to see that deviations from the inflation target feed
directly into the real exchange rate. Specifically, the more ambitious the reduction in the
target πe0 − πT and the smaller the size of σϑ2, the larger the required size of the real appre-
ciation on impact. A similar logic applies to the real interest rate. A very tight monetary
policy (that is, one that implies a very ambitious reduction in inflation) in a world of low
adjustment speeds requires a high real interest rate. In a nutshell, when IT is applied to
reduce inflation by a lot at short notice, and where inertial factors are very important, the
required changes in relative prices would be large.
This problem is obviously absent when there is no need to adjust relative prices during the
disinflation phase (that is, the initial conditions feature a slightly depreciated real exchange rate
or are close to equilibrium), or when the rate of inflation is already low and there is no internal
inflation. Unfortunately, neither of these conditions was present in the Argentinian case.
The previous model would be complete in the presence of perfect international capital
markets and assuming that the domestic economy did not follow an unstable trajectory
that required excessive indebtedness in foreign currency. This assumption is not necessa-
rily bad when applied to a stable economy that is not suffering from drastic adjustments.
Moreover, it certainly is not that bad for Latin American economies during the 2000s,
21. ϑ1 ¼ 0, as long as Q is defined by (17).
22. The expression πeðtÞ is a reminder that expected inflation evolves over time (we omitted time
everywhere else to simplify the notation).
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a period when the external account showed an important surplus due to the high com-
modity prices and historically low international interest rates. However, only during a
very specific (and most likely short) time span does it seem to be a good idea to rely
on external financing to achieve disinflation.
4.1 Adding an endogenous risk premium
Now let us explore the role that the balance-of-payment constraint may impose on the
stabilization process. We show that, barring some special cases, a stable equilibrium
may fail to exist. This is due to the nature of our model: more precisely, the fact that
the level of the real exchange rate that reduces wage demands and is consistent with
the stabilization of inflation is not necessarily consistent with external equilibrium. If
the real exchange rate that creates the condition for stabilization is very low and a large
stock of external debt is accumulated during the disinflation phase, IT will most likely fail.
Since from now on we will assume that the risk premium is an increasing function of
foreign indebtedness, we need to keep track of the stock of external debt. More precisely,
we let the ratio of foreign debt to productive capacity23 in domestic currency (evaluated
using the equilibrium real exchange rate) be given by F ¼ Q þ D− Y . Then, if the flow
of new debt _D ¼ _F (assuming that equilibrium real exchange rate and productive capacity
remain constant) is governed by interest payments and the trade deficit:
_F ¼ ði f þ∅ÞF −TBðY ;QÞ; (21)
where TB is the ratio of the trade balance to productive capacity measured in domestic
currency. In a nutshell, the rate of change of foreign debt is a function of interest pay-
ments on existing debt ði f þ∅ÞF minus the trade balance.
The trade balance is assumed to be a negative function of output (because imports
increase with output) and a positive function of the real exchange rate. We stick to the
following specification:
TB ¼ −φ1Y þ φ2Q with φ1;φ2 > 0: (22)
The risk premium is endogenous and defined by the function:
∅ ¼ ∅ðF Þ with ∅ ¼ 0 for F < F and ∅′> 0 for F ≥ F : (23)
Presumably, (23) applies for a sufficiently high level of debt F > F . For low levels of debt we
are back to the previous model where the external constraint does not bind, and for a reason-
able span of time the domestic economy can tap the international capital market for funds.
From (21), (22), and (23) it is possible to define the level of the real exchange rate that
is consistent with current-account balance _F ¼ 0 for a given level of output. Suppose
investors’ estimations assume that potential output prevails:
QBP ¼ φ1
Y þ ½i f þ∅ðF ÞF
φ2
¼ χðF Þ with χ′> 0 and χ″> 0: (24)
23. A more realistic approach will involve actual output, but this will needlessly complicate an
already complex model. The assumption used in the text could be justified, assuming that investors
calculate the capacity to pay using the past evolution of output, which was not very far away from
potential.
Inflation targeting, disinflation, and debt traps in Argentina 21
© 2019 The Author Journal compilation © 2019 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/05/2019 08:26:53AM by hquinn@e-elgar.co.uk
via Edward Elgar Publishing
Notice that the real exchange rate that is derived by investors from (24) may not be con-
sistent with social peace and constant inflation. If investors become increasingly concerned
about sustainability, then Q will not be derived from (17), but it will be consistent with
(24). This creates an enormous strain for IT when QBP > Q . This was emphasized, for
example, by Olivera (1991), Dornbusch (2000), and Gerchunoff/Rapetti (2016): the
real exchange rate that is consistent with ‘social peace’ need not be equal to the real
exchange rate that is consistent with external equilibrium. As we will see, an equilibrium
for the dynamic system may fail to exist, but the trajectories that do not imply an explo-
sion of indebtedness or those that imply that the target can be achieved when international
liquidity is plentiful are possible outcomes.
Now, solving the system by assuming that investors expect (24) to prevail implies that
the bliss point – that is, a steady state such that πe ¼ πT , Q ¼ Q (and also Y ¼ Y ) –
cannot be achieved. If we write down the evolution of the trade deficit assuming that
the old equilibrium real exchange rate holds, after substitution using (4), (5), and (12)
becomes:
−TB ¼ φ1β0 −φ1β1γ0 þ ðφ1β2 −φ2Þ Q þ γ1ðφ2θ′−φ1β1 −φ1β2θ′Þðπe − πT Þ: (25)
During the disinflation phase, debt will accumulate due to the effect of tight policies to
reduce inflation only if the following condition holds: φ2θ′>φ1β1 þ φ1β2θ′. This
requires that the effect of real appreciation on net exports is stronger than the negative
effect of higher real interest rates on output, which cuts imports (and thus might create
a surplus). Notice that it is usually assumed that depreciations are expansionary, but
assuming for instance that β2 < 0 reinforces the point:24 disinflation will worsen the
trade balance and will lead to an accumulation of debt, as a higher real interest rate
may decrease net exports not only through the direct effect of real appreciation, but
also due to the expansionary effects on demand. The previous insights thus hold: low
speed of adjustment and a large gap between expected inflation and the target will lead
to the build-up of a large trade deficit (see equation (15)).
Suppose now that a reduction of the inflation target is adopted.25 It follows that a
low level of debt and a relatively high speed of adjustment reduces the likelihood of
the debt threshold F being hit during the disinflation phase. Interestingly, and in
line with our model, higher inflation and smaller debt levels seem to increase the prob-
ability of the adoption of IT regimes (see, for example, Gonçavles/Carvalho 2009).
Thus, the empirical success of IT could be contingent on the initial conditions and
the structural conditions.
Then, for the general dynamic system,we need to assume the case where Q ¼ QBP ¼ χðF Þ
and γ0 ¼ r f þ ϕðF Þ. Combining (21)–(24) and using (24) in the original model we will
have a dynamic system with expected inflation and foreign debt as state variables:
π̇e ¼ σ½µ1 − µ2ðπe − πT Þ (26)
_F ¼ µ3 þ ½i f þ∅ðF ÞF þ φ1½− β1∅ðF Þ þ β2χðF Þ−φ2χðF Þ− µ4ðπe − πT Þ (27)
24. See Céspedes et al. (2003) for a review and a microfounded model showing why it could be
reasonable to assume that depreciations are contractionary in Latin America.
25. Also, it could be interpreted as the beginning of inflation targeting in the context of a moderate
and stable inflation regime, pursuing a disinflation path.
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with:
µ1 ¼ Ω½ω0 þ ω1β0 þ ðω2 þ ω1β2ÞχðF Þ− β1ω1ðr f þ∅ðF ÞÞ
µ2 ¼ Ωγ1½ðω2 þ ω1β2Þθ′þ β1ω1
µ3 ¼ φ1ðβ0 − β1r f Þ
µ4 ¼ γ1ð−φ1β1 þ φ1β2θ′−φ2θ′Þ:
Notice that µ2 ¼ ϑ2 and that µ1 ¼ ϑ1 ¼ 0 for F < F , and thus we are back to the original
system. The general solution of the system, _πe ¼ 0 and _F ¼ 0, is given by:
πe ¼ πT þ µ1
µ2
(28)
πe ¼ πT þ µ3 þ ½i
f þ∅ðF ÞF þ φ1½− β1∅ðF Þ þ β2χðF Þ−φ2χðF Þ
µ4
: (29)
These equations represent the combinations of expected inflation and foreign debt such that
expected inflation is equal to the target (28) and foreign debt is constant (29). They are a
function of expected inflation and foreign debt. Expected inflation affects _πe ¼ 0 in the
same way as in the original system: changes in expected inflation trigger a change in
the real interest rate (because the central bank follows a Taylor rule). Expected inflation
also affects the level of foreign debt because changes in the real interest rate affect employ-
ment and the level of the real exchange rate, which together affect the trade balance.
The level of foreign debt affects the system mainly through its effects on the risk pre-
mium. A higher level of foreign debt increases the risk premium, which in turn leads to an
increase in the real exchange rate, which affects output, inflation, and the trade balance.
More importantly, notice that from (28) and (29) it does not follow that there is solu-
tion that involves πe ¼ πT , and not even a reason why both equations will hold simulta-
neously: they may not intersect in the πe=F space. We do know that when debt is low
(F < F ), equation (28) implies that expected inflation satisfies πe ¼ πT , but this is not
necessarily true for (29). In the rest of the section we characterize the dynamic of the sys-
tem under different scenarios, briefly touching upon the issue of whether an equilibrium
exists.
Is the non-existence of equilibrium a problem? Not necessarily, because one plausible
implication is that external debt shrinks over time. In several instances, countries were able
to successfully pursue IT in a context of a current-account surplus, a reduction of external
debt, and so on.
To grasp intuitively the global behavior of the system, Figure 2 displays the case where
two equilibriums exist. Appendix 1 discusses the conditions under which the system will
be characterized by Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows that the economy will reach the good equilibrium only by fluke, but if
the economy starts at the left of the dashed line, IT is still sustainable: the inflation target
is achieved and debt shrinks. This requires a fast adjustment of inflation and a slow build-
up of debt: in other words the economy should be located at the left of the stable arm of
the system. If these conditions are not meet, or if the initial position is to the right of the
saddle-path, the economy will eventually sit down at the bad equilibrium where expected
inflation and inflation are always above the target.
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However, the conditions that are required to obtain the case illustrated in Figure 2 are
very special. They require that higher expected inflation improves the trade balance. As
expected inflation increases, the real interest rate increases and the real exchange rate
appreciates. To create a current-account surplus, the effect of the real exchange rate on
foreign trade should be mild and the real exchange-rate appreciation should not be expan-
sionary. If this is not the case, then _F ¼ 0 has an upward slope (for all values of external
debt and expected inflation) and the good equilibrium may fail to exist.
Alternatively, if the parameters that govern the exogenous component of demand are
very large (β0) or the equilibrium real exchange rate when liquidity is plentiful, Q is
very low, then π̇e ¼ 0 will start below _F ¼ 0 and the good equilibrium no longer exists.
Violations of the conditions (A1) and (A2) will reverse the slope of the curves once we
have F ≥ F , and the bad equilibrium will disappear or it may be unstable.
Finally, notice that the good equilibrium is unstable. If the economy starts to the right
of the saddle-path (the dashed line in Figure 2), then debt and expected inflation will fol-
low an explosive path. Only if the economy starts to the left can IT succeed in reducing
inflation without creating too much external debt (in fact external indebtedness falls).
To summarize, the conditions to obtain two equilibriums seem to be very special. Even
if they are present, it is possible that the economy will settle down at the bad equilibrium
(which implies that the target is always missed). When one equilibrium or none exist,
avoiding an explosion of debt seems unlike if the speed of adjustment of inflation is
low and debt builds up fast.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has discussed the role of IT as a stabilization policy in the Argentinian case.
Specifically, we have highlighted the role of external indebtedness dynamics in order to
assess the effectiveness and the sustainability of IT as a stabilization policy. Although
the regime performed reasonably well in terms of inflation and growth everywhere else,
Argentina is one of the very few cases where IT was abandoned.
Our paper suggests that fast adjustment of inflation and a slow build-up (or a low






Figure 2 Phase diagram
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the long run. When inflation adjusts slowly or external debt builds up quickly, IT may
collapse. This paper has thus contributed to a large literature on stabilization policies,
and shares some skepticism regarding the role of a monetary framework that relies on a
short-term interest rate as the main stabilization tool (in the context of an extremely
open capital account).
Our narrative and our model also draw heavily on the literature on the effects of IT. More
precisely, we have relied on the evidence that shows that, under IT, disinflation is usually a
gradual process, and that a current-account deficit is likely to emerge. In fact, none of
these trends is specific to IT, as almost all the stabilization attempts that start from moderate
levels of inflation seem to display similar trends. However, the literature has questioned
whether IT is special. Our answer, based on a revision of the facts, seems to be no. This sug-
gests that the authorities made a mistake adopting an IT regime in Argentina, and the success
of an IT regime should not be taken for granted as a disinflation tool, considering that infla-
tion seems to fall very slowly and current-account deficits may become unsustainable.
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APPENDIX 1
This appendix discusses the specific conditions under which (23) and (24) have two equi-
libria. The constant inflation locus (23) is, for low values of external debt, a straight line,
but it becomes upward-sloped once F ≥ F , assuming µ2 > 0 (the condition for stability
assumed in equation (19)), and provided the following condition holds:
ω1β1∅′ðF Þ< ðω2 þ ω1β2Þχ′ðF Þ: (A1)
To see this, consider (23) and calculate ∂π
e
∂F using the definitions of µ1 and µ2. This is the likely
case when depreciations exert a strong effect on inflation (captured by ω2), even if there exist
strong contractionary effects from depreciations and the level of output is an important deter-
minant of inflation (this is captured by ω1 and β2). Notice that, because of equation (24), the
ratio χ′ðF Þ=∅′ðF Þ is increasing in F , so (A1) becomes more likely as external debt increases.
Due to the effect of interest payments i f on existing debt, and if µ4 < 0, the _F ¼ 0
locus (24) has a positive slope for low levels of debt, but becomes downward-sloping
once F ≥ F , if:
i f þ∅′F þ∅ðF Þ þ φ1β2χ′ðF Þ>φ2χ′ðF Þ þ φ1β1∅′F ; (A2)
which will be less likely if contractionary effects of depreciation (β2 < 0Þ prevail and if
trade and income elasticities are large enough. Notice that if this condition does not pre-
vail, _F ¼ 0 will show a positive slope and only one equilibrium or two steady states may
exist, but the equilibrium of high debt and high inflation will also be unstable. In order to
be short, we will continue the analysis assuming that the condition (26) holds. Otherwise
_F ¼ 0 becomes upward-sloped after F ≥ F .
Notice that (A1) and (A2) are not enough to establish the existence of an equilibrium with
low debt and where the target is attained. The two curves will cross if for low levels of external
debt the previous conditions holds and (23) lies above (24) for a low level of debt. We know
that the constant inflation locus is defined by πe ¼ πT . Will (24) lie above or below πT ? That
depends on the sign of the second part of equations (23) and (24). When evaluated at low
levels of F , the risk premiums are gone and Q is the long-run expected real exchange rate (the
level where international liquidity is plentiful). Barring the interest payments, the model is no
longer a function of F ; but it depends on the structural conditions that define the trade
account and investors expect the equilibrium real exchange rate Q to prevail.
With expansionary depreciations, for a sufficiently high Q this will push down the
locus _F ¼ 0 (so we will have πe > πT ) below the _πe ¼ 0 locus (which by definition starts
at πe ¼ πT ). In this case, the curves eventually intersect. This is the only combination that
features a stable equilibrium (when the two curves cross after the critical threshold level),
but is one where the target is systematically missed. While we were revising this manu-
script, Argentina abandoned its IT regime, and interestingly, the central bank failed to
deliver the target during all the years in which the regime lasted. It can be shown that
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which implies that the equilibrium where the target is not achieved is locally stable.
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